The following is a complete collection of past case briefs from the North Carolina Law Review Forum that provide concise summary and brief, high-level analysis of cases from the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Payne Walton | December 2025
In certain instances of legislative and regulatory ambiguity, courts exercise increased interpretative power over a piece of legislation. For example, when the plain meaning of a statute is unclear, courts may go beyond the text, interpreting the purpose and intent of the legislature when the statute was enacted. Similarly, in a regulatory context, not every interpretation by a state agency is deserving of deference. In Philip Morris USA v. North Carolina Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court of North Carolina relied on these principles of judicial interpretation to reject the application of the Export Credit Statute (“ECS”) by the North Carolina Department of Revenue (the “Department”).
In the aforementioned case, Philip Morris, a cigarette manufacturer, sought the right to carry forward unused tax credits from previous years under North Carolina’s ECS. Philip Morris generated more than $6 million of tax credits in 2005 and 2006. The company attempted to claim the excess credits in 2012, 2013, and 2014—purporting to carry forward the tax credits that were generated but not claimed in 2005 and 2006. The specific issue in the case is one of statutory interpretation. The ECS limits the “credit allowed” to be claimed under the statute to $6 million per year. If “credit allowed” is defined strictly as the amount of tax credits that can be claimed in a year, Philip Morris could still generate tax credits over the $6 million threshold in 2005 and 2006, and claim the excess credits in subsequent years. But, if “credit allowed” is defined broadly as the amount of tax credits that can be generated in a year, Philip Morris would be capped not only at claiming but at generating $6 million in tax credits per year, rendering its “carryforward” claims in 2012, 2013, and 2014 invalid.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the term “credit allowed” was defined differently in two different subsections of the ECS, creating a statutory ambiguity. This ambiguity allowed the court to look beyond the plain language of the statute to consider the intent of the legislature. In doing so, the court concluded that the $6-million-tax-credit cap only restricted the amount of credits that can be claimed in a year, leaving the door open for taxpayers to generate credits beyond $6 million and claim the excess in subsequent years. Thus, the court sanctioned the generation of excess tax credits in 2005–2006 and the claim of those tax credits in 2012–2014.
William J. Etringer | December 2025
Though nearing extinction in the modern system of pleas, juries were often praised by the Founders. Thomas Jefferson famously described juries as “the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” Alexander Hamilton echoed that juries were either “a valuable safeguard to liberty” or “the very palladium of free government.” Coupling them with representative government more broadly, John Adams considered juries to be “the heart and lungs” of liberty, and the “fortification against . . . being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and clothed like swine and hounds.”
In State v. King, Jason William King’s jury trial right was unquestionably violated. After his trial, Mr. King was convicted of driving while impaired (“DWI”) and reckless driving. At sentencing, despite Section 20-179(a1)(2) requiring a jury to find aggravating factors, the presiding judge found three aggravating factors for the DWI in violation of Mr. King’s statutory right to a jury trial. Mr. King appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which vacated both convictions and remanded for new sentencing hearings. In doing so, the court of appeals refused to apply harmless error analysis to the trial court’s violation of Mr. King’s jury trial right under Section 20-179(a1)(2). The State appealed, arguing that the court of appeals should have applied harmless error analysis to the error.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with the State. The court reasoned that the statute did not expressly provide for structural error analysis, was only meant to comply with federal constitutional requirements, and mirrored a similar provision in the Structured Sentencing Act, which receives harmless error analysis. Justice Earls dissented.
D. McLean Campbell | December 2025
When the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the nation, governments responded by shuttering restaurants, coffeehouses, and retail shops to “stop the spread.” These closures, initially temporary, extended into months of dark storefronts, and “for lease” signs began to replace the names of once-favorite local spots. But in the years since, COVID has gradually slipped from our public memory, and businesses face more topical challenges like supply-chain disruptions and inflation. Not so for the owners of seventeen North Carolina businesses. Their experience with the pandemic remained largely uncertain until the state’s highest court handed down two companion decisions in late 2024.
In Cato Corp. v. Zurich American Insurance and North State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance, business-plaintiffs sought coverage for COVID-related revenue losses. In Cato, the court dismissed the insured’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but in North State, the court granted the restaurateurs’ claim for declaratory judgment. The difference? Zurich’s policy contained a viral contamination exclusion. Cincinnati’s did not. Viewed in isolation, these decisions offer routine applications of established insurance doctrine. Against the backdrop of cases holding for the insurer, however, Cato and North State reveal something significant: North Carolina courts’ willingness to apply interpretative principles faithfully—regardless of the potential consequences of doing so. That fidelity allowed the North State plaintiffs to recover what they deserved.
Kathryn Turk | December 2024
Determining whether evidence is relevant in criminal proceedings can be a delicate balance. Too stringent a standard could block exculpatory evidence and lead to wrongful convictions. Too lax of a standard could overwhelm juries and derail trials. Under North Carolina law, the standard of relevance for evidence implicating third parties is that the evidence “must (1) point directly to the guilt of some specific person, and (2) be inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt.” In State v. Abbitt, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered how to apply that standard where evidence suggested that the defendants may have had an unidentified accomplice—introducing the possibility that both the defendants and the implicated third party were involved in the commission of the crime. The Supreme Court of North Carolina deemed the evidence implicating a third party in Abbitt inadmissible because even though it tended to show a third party’s involvement, it was not inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt. In doing so, the court set a high bar for showing that evidence is “inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt” that may require future defendants to offer additional evidence that the third party was not their accomplice.
IN RE R.A.F.—BEWARE OF THE “HAUNTING SPECTER”
Sam W. Scheipers | December 2024
Despite parents, advocates, and courts reconceptualizing the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) as the “civil death penalty,” parents in TPR proceedings do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. However, in an effort to ensure parental rights are only terminated when a parent cannot provide for their child’s physical and emotional well-being, North Carolina provides parents with a statutory right to counsel in TPR proceedings. This statutory right, codified in section 7B-1101.1 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, includes a requirement that the court appoint counsel to parents who are indigent.
And yet, in In re R.A.F., a mother facing the civil death penalty still found herself without counsel due to the limitations placed on indigent parents’ right to court-appointed counsel in TPR proceedings. After establishing a right to court-appointed counsel, section 7B-1101.1 instructs that the court must dismiss a parent’s provisional court-appointed counsel upon a finding that any of several statutorily enumerated grounds exists, including a parent’s failure to appear at the first hearing. In In re R.A.F., the mother’s provisional counsel was dismissed pursuant to the failure-to-appear exception after the mother did not appear at the first hearing. She appealed the dismissal of her provisional counsel, arguing that although she failed to appear, the trial court judge’s single question to her provisional counsel, “[A]ny contact from your client, ma’am?,” failed to ensure the fundamental fairness of the procedures that resulted in the
termination of her parental rights.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed. Rejecting the mother’s argument, the court held that the statutes were “abundantly clear” about the extent that a trial judge must inquire into a parent’s absence before dismissing their provisional counsel: a trial judge only needs to determine whether the parent is present at the first hearing; if they are not present, the parent’s provisional counsel is dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that, unlike situations where counsel attempts to withdraw from representation, the unilateral dismissal of provisional counsel by the court does not require considerations of fundamental fairness.
STATE V. FLOW—DID THE TRIAL COURT PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE?
Sam W. Scheipers | December 2024
A defendant’s right not to stand trial in a criminal case unless they are competent to do so is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence. This right is enshrined in the Due Process Clause of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The General Statutes of North Carolina codify this right as well by providing that a criminal defendant may not be “tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime” when they are not competent.
In State v. Flow, Scott Warren Flow’s statutory right to stand trial only when competent was arguably violated. After both Mr. Flow and the State had presented their closing arguments, but before the jury had received its instructions and begun its deliberations, Mr. Flow jumped off a second-story mezzanine at the Gaston County Jail. While he was in the hospital receiving surgery for his injuries, Mr. Flow asserted his statutory right not to stand trial because he was incompetent. His defense attorney asked the trial court, pursuant to section 15A-1002(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, to delay any further proceedings until it determined whether Mr. Flow had the capacity to proceed. The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing into whether Mr. Flow’s actions were voluntary, concluding that they were and that, therefore, the trial could proceed in his absence.On appeal, Mr. Flow argued that the hearing was insufficient because the trial court inquired into whether his actions were voluntary instead of whether he had the capacity to proceed as required by section 15A-1002(b)(1).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed. Addressing whether the trial court erred by not inquiring further into Mr. Flow’s capacity to proceed after concluding he had voluntarily absented himself, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court’s hearing was statutorily sufficient. In resolving the issue, the court concluded that the hearing requirement in section 15A-1002(b)(1) is satisfied as long as a defendant is given “an opportunity to present any and all evidence” during a hearing.
Bradford Moore Lewis | April 2024
Recently, notorious officer misconduct has placed the conduct of police under increased scrutiny. In response, Americans have demanded more accountability and checks on police power and discretion. One original check on police misconduct, found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” However, courts have allowed police some discretion to search and detain individuals when executing a legal warrant out of concern for officer safety. Thus, the question has become where to draw the line between protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights and allowing officers to safely execute a warrant.
In North Carolina, a recent case made the question even more specific: How far away can an individual, not subject to a search warrant, be from the premises of the warrant and still be detained out of safety concerns for officers? In State v. Tripp, the Supreme Court of North Carolina suggests that the answer is sixty yards. However, the divided court could not form a majority, leaving the ultimate answer in North Carolina undecided.
COMMITTEE TO ELECT DAN FOREST V. EMPLOYEES POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
Kate Giduz | January 2023
The “thorny thicket” of standing is a “tortuous track”—a track that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has tried to avoid. At a constitutional minimum, federal standing requires three elements: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
State standing, however, can be more permissive than federal standing. While some state courts have explicitly addressed standing under their state constitutions, until 2021, North Carolina had not directly addressed what the North Carolina Constitution requires for a plaintiff to enter the “courthouse doors.” In Committee to Elect Dan Forest v. Employees Political Action Committee, the Supreme Court of North Carolina finally confronted this question. In doing so, it held that the North Carolina Constitution does not require injury in fact, and it eliminated proof of injury in fact as a prerequisite for statutory standing. The court held that as long as a plaintiff has a cause of action under a statute, and as long as their interests are injured or they are in the class of persons that the statute aims to protect, “the legal injury itself gives rise to standing.”
Gabrielle L. Motsinger | January 2022
The rate of sexual assault in higher education continues to be alarmingly high. Although legislation, such as Title IX, has been enacted to ensure that universities are responding promptly to sexual assault allegations, compliance is not guaranteed. When the Office for Civil Rights began to investigate the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for noncompliance and mishandling sexual assault cases, media outlets filed an action seeking disclosure of disciplinary records of students that had violated UNC’s sexual assault policy. In DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, the Supreme Court of North Carolina mandated the release of these records. The court held that the University does not have discretion to withhold the disciplinary records—as stated in the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”)—but instead is required to disclose the information under the North Carolina Public Records Act.
George Dylan Boan | January 2022
It is every parent’s worst nightmare—their small child comes across a loaded gun. In a flash, tragedy strikes. To compound the psychological toll of losing their child under these circumstances, imagine it happens at the home of someone entrusted with the care of their child. The question becomes: Can the parents sustain a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) for the suffering bound to ensue? It was precisely this question that the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed in Newman v. Stepp on December 18, 2020.
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. In Newman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed problems with the trial court’s review and decision regarding the second element. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that in evaluating an NIED pleading, “the question of reasonable foreseeability must be determined under all of the facts presented and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis instead of mechanistic requirement[s] associated with the presence or absence of the Johnson factors.”
Sarah A. Benecky | January 2021
On August 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of North Carolina changed the course of Marcus Robinson’s life. The court vacated Robinson’s death sentence under the since-repealed Racial Justice Act (“RJA” or “the Act”), reinstating his sentence of life imprisonment without parole. This was not the first time Robinson had been taken off death row. In 2012, Robinson successfully challenged his capital sentence under the RJA and was resentenced to life imprisonment. However, the following year, Republicans strengthened their control over the North Carolina legislature. The legislature repealed the RJA and added a provision to make the repeal apply retroactively. Robinson returned to death row.
In its recent decision in State v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court violated Robinson’s rights under the North Carolina Constitution by reimposing his death sentence pursuant to the repeal of the RJA. In the court’s view, the trial court’s 2012 finding that race was a substantial factor in Robinson’s sentencing constituted an acquittal of the death penalty for purposes of double jeopardy. The Robinson decision marked the first time the Supreme Court of North Carolina explicitly recognized the pervasive racial bias evident in the state’s use of capital punishment.
Meredith I. Lewis | January 2021
It is no secret that North Carolina courts fall drastically behind other states in regard to addressing racial discrimination in jury selection. The historic U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Batson v. Kentucky prohibited the use of race-based peremptory challenges in 1986, but North Carolina courts have continued to ignore and misapply the proper standard from that case. Notably, North Carolina remains the only state in the Fourth Circuit—and the South as a whole—whose appellate courts have found only one substantive Batson violation, despite having faced the issue over one hundred times. The Supreme Court of North Carolina issued a recent opinion on the matter in State v. Hobbs on May 1, 2020. This case represents the first time in ten years that the high court has heard a Batson challenge.
It is well established that a Batson challenge requires the trial court to conduct a three-step inquiry. First, the defendant must make a prima facie case of discriminatory intent; second, the State must offer a race-neutral justification for the challenge; and third, the trial court must determine if the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. In Hobbs, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed problems with the lower courts’ review and decisions on steps one and three. Hobbs is an important case for North Carolina trial judges and attorneys because: (1) it emphasizes that the burden of proving a prima facie case is lower than that which is applied by North Carolina courts, (2) it clarifies the standard of review for district and appellate courts when reviewing Batson claims, and (3) it provides additional instruction and awareness to prosecutors when using peremptory strikes.
Will Bowers | May 2020
On May 10, 2019, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion in Piazza v. Kirkbride. After Neogence Enterprises, Inc. began experiencing financial troubles which caused it to cease business performance, its angel investors filed suit in Wake County Superior Court to recoup their investments. The investors, enticed to invest by statements from two Neogence executives, Mr. David Kirkbride and Mr. Robert Rice, and a Neogence director, Dr. Gregory Brannon, argued that the statements were material misstatements under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-56(a)(2). In the trial court and on appeal, Dr. Brannon contended that (1) he was not a “seller” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-56(a)(2) because he did not own the securities; (2) he did not have the required scienter under the statute; (3) the “Director Safe Harbor” provision of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act shielded him from civil liability; and (4) the verdicts were inconsistent after a jury exonerated one of the Neogence executives, but not Dr. Brannon.
At the trial court level, a jury ruled against Dr. Brannon, and the appeals court affirmed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed with modifications. Dodging the merits of Dr. Brannon’s defenses, three of which were of first impression, the Court relied on procedure, holding that Dr. Brannon did not preserve his defenses because he did not properly request their inclusion in the necessary jury instructions.
Kelsey Cullinan Reed | May 2020
This case turns on the question of whether the trial court erred by terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter, Bev, because she “had failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to Bev’s removal from her home.” Bev was born on April 4, 2015, and on August 9, 2015, law enforcement arrested both parents after responding to a request from the mother for help in dealing with a domestic violence situation with the father. The next day, the Granville County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that the child was a neglected juvenile and a judge entered an order granting nonsecure custody to DSS because Bev had been in the home during the altercation and had a bruised right arm.
On January 25, 2017, DSS filed a petition to have the mother’s parental rights terminated because she had “neglected Bev and had ‘willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances ha[d] been made in correcting those conditions which led to removal of the juvenile.’” On September 8, 2017, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights in Bev under § 7B-1111(a)(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes because termination of her parental rights was in Bev’s best interests.
Ryan Collins | May 2020
On May 14, 2013, Torrey Grady walked out of the New Hanover County Courthouse in Wilmington, North Carolina, with the knowledge that he would spend the rest of his life under the watchful eyes of the State. Mr. Grady had not received a life sentence, nor even been sentenced at all—indeed, as far as the State of North Carolina was concerned, he had received all of the punishment he was due for a series of sex crimes committed between 1997 and 2006. However, pursuant to a law passed by the General Assembly in 2010, Mr. Grady had been ordered to enroll in the state’s satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) program. The statute requires that certain classes of sex offenders be automatically subjected to electronic tracking, via an ankle bracelet, for the remainder of their natural lives, without any individualized consideration of the defendant’s particular circumstances.
What followed was six years of appellate litigation, including a trip the United States Supreme Court, in which Grady contested the constitutionality of his mandatory SBM enrollment. Grady alleged that the imposition of SBM “violate[d] his rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment . . .” In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the program did in fact constitute a Fourth Amendment search, but remanded the case back to the state courts to determine whether or not the search as “unreasonable” and therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of North Carolina put the issue to rest, at least temporarily, in August of 2019 when it concluded that the search was unreasonable with regard to individuals who, like Grady, “are subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their status as a statutorily defined ‘recidivist.’” The case presents a deep, if nuanced, insight into the court’s thinking on the emergent technology of satellite based monitoring and its future within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Kelsey Cullinan Reed | May 2020
In the case In re J.A.M., the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed whether a trial court’s finding that an infant was neglected was supported by clear and convincing evidence as required by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the “cumulative weight” of the factual findings of the trial court was sufficient to support an adjudication of neglect and held that the appellate court had properly applied the required standard of review. In particular, the Court held that previous adjudications of neglect of other children in the home plus present risk factors were enough to support an adjudication of neglect of J.A.M.